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OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 
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Relationship Investing: ·Will It Happen? 
Will It Work? 
JILL E. FISCH* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Sixty years ago, in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 1 
Berle and Means explained that the separation of ownership and control in 
the modern public corporation interferes with the ability of stockholders 
effectively to monitor corporate decisionmakers. More recently,  scholars 
have elaborated on Berle and Means' hypothesis, explaining that agency 
costs and collective action problems both limit the ability of shareholders 
to monitor and reduce the financial incentives to do so. 2 
Current academic scholarship suggests a possible solution to the 
problem of inadequate monitoring by shareholders. Responding to ongoing 
changes in the nature of shareholding, particularly the move from dispersed 
individual shareholders to an aggregation of holdings in mutual funds, 
pension funds, and insurance companies, commentators argue that the 
growth of institutional investors provides the answer to traditional 
problems of shareholder participation in corporate governance. 3 
• Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law; B .A.,  Cornell 
University, 1 982; J.D., Yale Law School, 1985. I am grateful to Marc Arkin, Joel 
Seligman, Steve Thel, Bill Treanor and my mother for their helpful comments on 
earlier drafts of this Article and to the participants in the George Mason University 
School of Law Faculty Workshop Series for their helpful critiques. 
1 ADoLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C .  MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRNATE PROPERTY (1932). 
2 See, e.g. , Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of 
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 454 n.29 (199 1) (summarizing 
literature discussing collective action problem in the corporate context) . For an 
overview of the problem associated with collective action, see MANCUR OLSON, THE 
LCXJIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (2d ed. 1 97 1) .  
3 See, e.g. , Bernard S .  Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of 
Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REv. 8 1 1 ,  830-49 (1992) [hereinafter Black, 
Agents Watching Agents] ; Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the 
Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REv. 863 (1991);  
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Advocates of institutional investor activism assert that institutions, 
because of their larger investment stake and better access to information, 
can monitor corporate decisionmaking more easily than individual 
shareholders, and that the larger proportionate holdings of these investors 
make monitoring more profitable, overcoming collective action p roblems.4 
Using models that portray money spent on monitoring as an investment, 
these scholars argue that, as the size of an investor's shareholdings in a 
company grows, the cost of monitoring is more easily justified. Hence the 
large investor, commonly the institutional investor, is more l ikely to 
monitor. 
The investment community has most recently focused its attention on a 
new form of investor activism: relationship investing .5 Relationship 
investing may be described as a large long-term financial commitment by 
an investor to a portfolio company in exchange for a say as to how it is 
run. 6 Promoters of relationship investing tout it as a vehicle for 
establishing l ong-term advisory relationships between institutional investors 
and the companies in which they invest. 7 They argue that relationship 
investing will provide accountability for management through the p resence 
of investors with a sufficient stake to monitor. 8 Because of its l ong-term 
Robert G. Vanecko, Regulations 14A and 13D and the Role of Institutional Investors 
in Corporate Governance, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 376, 3 8 1-82 (1992); BernardS. B lack, 
Beyond Proxy Reform, INSIGHTS (Mar. 1993), at 2 [hereinafter Black, Beyond Proxy 
Reform] . 
4 See, e.g. , Lucian A. Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing 
Legal Policy Toward Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REv. 107 1 ,  108 1 ( 1990); George W. 
Dent, Jr. ,  Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation ,  1989 
Wrs. L. REv. 8 8 1 ,  907; Henry T.C.  Hu, Risk, Time and Fidudary Prindples in 
Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REv. 277, 374 (1990). 
5 See, e.g. , Judith H. Dobrzynski, Relationship Investing, Bus. WK., Mar. 15,  
1 993 , at 68 (describing relationship investing as "[a] provocative new investment 
idea"); Felix Rohatyn, Dinner Address at the Relational Investing Conference (New 
York, May 6, 1993) (on file with author) ('"Relationships' are now in vogue . ... "). 
In May, 1993 , the Columbia Institutional Investor Project sponsored a two-day 
conference on relationship investing, which involved the most extensive treatment of 
the subject to date. 
6 Martin Dickson, Crusaders in the Capitalist Cause: U.S. Shareholder Activists 
Are Gearing Up to Make Underpeifonning Managements More Accountable, FIN. 
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1 993, at 17; cJ. Dobrzynski, supra note 5, at 68 (describing 
relationship investing as any established committed link between a company and one 
or more of its shareholders) . 
7 David Vise, Shifting the Boardroom Balance of Power, WASH. PosT, Mar. 6, 
1993 , at D l. 
8 Dobrzynski, supra note 5 .  
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orientation, relationship investing is also more palatable politically, as it 
responds to the common criticism that institutional investors are focused 
too heavily on the short term. 9 
A few skeptics question the premise that institutional investors will be 
able to engage in more effective monitoring than traditional shareholders. 
One issue is whether institutions will accept the l imitations on investment 
flexibil ity10 that may result from more active participation in corporate 
governance. 11 Another concern is whether institutions possess the 
necessary expertise to monitor effectively, even if they are willing to 
monitor . 12 Political constraints also restrict the activism of many 
institutional investors . 13 F inally, various state and federal laws prevent 
some institutions from active participation in corporate governance, and 
public concerns about the appropriate role and balance of power for such 
institutions may l imit legal reform.14 
This Article challenges the received academic wisdom in favor of 
relationship investing from another and more fundamental perspective: it 
argues that relationship investing is less attractive to the rational investor 
and hence less likely to occur than its advocates have contended . 
Relationship investing will be the exception, not the rule, unless the 
companies concerned are allowed to confer special benefits on the 
relationship investor. There has been no showing, to date, that such 
benefits are warranted. 
The focus of this Article is on the traditional economic model that 
explains the investor's decision to monitor in terms of an evaluation of the 
relative costs and benefits of monitoring. The Article concludes that the 
traditional model is incomplete because it does not adequately account for 
the competitive environment in which institutions operate and are 
9 Id. 
10 Long-term activism may require an investor to sacrifice liquidity. See John C. 
Coffee, Jr. ,  Liquidity versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 
91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991) . In addition, certain types of participation in 
corporate governance, such as board representation, may place additional limits on an 
investor's freedom to trade by, for example, subjecting the investor to insider trading 
liability or liability for short swing trading under § 1 6  of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934. 
11 See id. (questioning whether institutional investors will sacrifice liquidity for 
greater control over portfolio companies) . 
12 E.g. , Vanecko, supra note 3 ,  at 406-08. 
13 E.g. , Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate 
Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 795 (1993). 
14 E.g. , Mark J. Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund 
Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1 469 (199 1). 
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evaluated. The model is premised on the assumption that investors will 
monitor whenever monitoring increases their profits in absolute terms . It 
fails to account for the fact that the performance of many institutional 
investors is evaluated on a comparative rather than an absolute basis . In 
other words, a rational investor will not monitor if monitoring confers 
greater benefits on competitors who , as free riders, are able to benefit from 
the stock price increases caused by the monitoring without incurring its 
costs. 
Judging investments in comparative rather than absolute terms affects 
the operation of the model and causes the rational institutional investor to 
invest less in monitoring than traditional theory would indicate. Moreover, 
in order for an investor to benefit, on a comparative basis, from 
monitoring, it must increase its relative stake in the target company. This 
concentration, because it increases the risk of the investment, again 
increases the cost of monitoring. This Article will demonstrate the effect of 
this approach on the economic model of monitoring and demonstrate that, 
because of these additions to the model , institutional activism is less likely 
to occur than traditional theory would indicate. 
The role of competition in the monitoring decision helps explain why 
few institutions have engaged in relationship investing. This Article also 
evaluates recent evidence on the extent of institutional activism and argues 
that the creation of an opportunity for a large investor to obtain private 
gains15 better explains the existence of specific relationships than the 
enhancement of corporate decisionmaking. 
The ability to generate private gains operates to counter some of the 
effects of competition and to make institutional activism more l ikely .  If we 
wish to see relationship investing play a significant role in the economy, 
the law will have to facilitate, or at least not hinder, transactions that allow 
the creation of private gains . Changing the law is appropriate, however, 
only if relationship investing improves corporate performance. In its final 
section, drawing on previous critiques of relationship investing, this 
Article examines the limited evidence on the value of relationship 
investing. 
15 Private gains are returns from relationship investing that accrue to the activist 
shareholder in some proportion greater than the shareholder's pro rata interest in the 
company. See discussion infra part IV.C. 
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II. SHAREHOLDER MONITORING AND THE PROMISE OF 
INSTITUTIONAL VOICE 
1013 
Classical corporate theory is , by and large, based on the notion of 
shareholder primacy . 16 Although state statutes provide that the corporation 
is to be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors, 17 
management decisions are supposed to be made with a view to promoting 
the interests of shareholders . The justification for this approach is twofold. 
First, under classical theories of the corporation, shareholders have the 
legal status of owners . 18  Second, economic theory dictates that 
management decisions designed to promote the interests of the residual 
owners of the corporation are most efficient. 19  Accordingly, increasing the 
16 Members of the modern corporate governance community are divided into two 
camps: the shareholder primacy camp and the stakeholder camp. The former believe 
that problems of corporate performance can be attributed to a lack of corporate 
responsiveness to the needs of shareholders and rectified by solutions that reduce the 
separation between ownership and control. The latter believe that corporations are 
properly responsive to the needs of a variety of stakeholders, including employees, 
creditors, and members of the community and that corporations should be less rather 
than more responsive to the needs of shareholders. Because relationship investing is 
advocated as a tool for increasing shareholder primacy, it is unnecessary to examine 
the stakeholder model in further detail here. To the extent that advocates of the 
German and Japanese governance models have characterized relationship investing as 
stakeholder-oriented, based on its ability to further the interests of creditors (banks) in 
the German model, and customers and suppliers in the Japanese model, this process 
can alternatively be described as the creation, by these "dual role" investors, of 
private gains. See, e.g. , Julian Franks & Colin Mayer, Corporate Control: A Synthesis 
of the International Experience (working paper presented at Columbia 1993 
symposium); see infra part IV.C (discussing private gains) . 
17 See, e.g. , DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1991) ("The business and affairs 
of every corporation ... shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors .... "); CAL. CoRP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1990) ("the business and affairs 
of the corporation shall be managed and all corporate powers shall be exercised by or 
under the direction of the board."); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 701 (Consol. 1994) 
("[t]he business of a corporation shall be managed under the direction of its board of 
directors .... ") . 
1 8  E.g. , Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 589 (1933) (describing shareholders as 
"the real owners of the corporate property "); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 
1115, 1124 (Del. Ch. 1990); In re Steinway, 53 N.E. 1103, 1105 (N.Y. 1899) (citing 
cases). See generally William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Finn: 
Critical Perspectives From History, 41 STAN. L. REv. 1471 (1989). 
19 See, e.g. , Jonathan R. Macey, Symposium, Fundamental Corporate Changes: 
Causes, Effects and Legal Responses: Externalities, Finn-Specific Capital Investments, 
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fidelity of management decisions to shareholder interests will improve 
corporate performance. 2o 
As Berle and Means recognized, the separation of ownership and 
control in the public corporation creates a problem with this approach to 
corporate governance. The separation of ownership and control results in 
management by nonowners whose interests diverge from those of the 
shareholders on whose behalf management decisions are made. 21 This 
and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental and Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
173 ,  1 80-8 1 ;  see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael Jensen, Agency Problems and 
Residual Qaims, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 327 (1983); Oliver Williamson, Organizational 
Form, Residual Qaimants, and Corporate Control, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 351  ( 1983). 
This efficiency results from two factors. First, specialized management is likely to 
outperform diversified owners with respect to the quality of corporate decisions. See, 
e.g. , ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR. , S CALE AND S COPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL 
CAPITALISM 232 ( 1990) (arguing that separation of ownership and control developed 
as response to increasing complexity of modern business) . Second, commentators 
argue that the interests of the residual owners , in terms of risk and reward, are most 
closely akin to the long-term interests of the corporation. Accordingly, a structure that 
maximizes shareholder value is likely to maximize corporate value. See, e.g. , Armen 
A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REv. 777 (1972); see also ROBERTA RoMANO, THE 
GENIUS OP AMERICAN C ORPORATE LAW 2-3 (AEI Press 1993) (explaining that 
shareholder primacy model provides clear-cut decisional rule for managers, allocates 
capital resources and "best matches organizational design with incentives") ; Stephen 
M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to 
Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1423 , 1438 (1993) (defending shareholder 
wealth maximization model of corporate governance as best able to constrain 
management sin, because other models allow management to "pursue its own self­
interest by playing shareholders off against nonshareholders"). 
20 The call for increased shareholder monitoring to improve corporate 
performance is based on two fundamental premises: (1) that corporate governance 
matters in improving corporate performance, and (2) that U.S. corporate performance 
is declining, either in absolute terms or relative to international competitors such as 
German or Japanese corporations, and requires improvement. For a more detailed 
analysis of the first point, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: 
A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 124-25 n. 1 (1994) (discussing 
relationship between corporate governance and performance) . On the second point, 
see Ira M. Millstein, The Evolution of the Certifying Board, 48 Bus. LAW. 1485, 1487 
(1993) (arguing that a general consensus has found U.S. corporate performance to 
have fallen behind that of our competitors and concluding that corporate governance 
can have an "obvious" impact on corporate performance and hence competitiveness). 
21 See generally Jill E. Fisch, Frankenstein 's Monster Hits the Campaign Trail: 
An Approach to Regulation of Corporate Political Expenditures, 32 WM. & MARY L. 
REv. 587, 633-35 (1991) (describing separation of ownership and control and legal 
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results in agency costs that prevent the corporation from being operated in 
the most efficient and profitable manner possible.22 
Monitoring is one way to reduce agency costs .23 The active 
participation of shareholders in monitoring corporate management, 
according to traditional corporate theory, can improve the performance of 
the corporation. 24 Corporate law is based on the premise that shareholder 
monitoring is valuable; it provides a number of mechanisms by which 
shareholders can review management decisions and correct improprieties .25 
Monitoring, however, is not free. Every instance of shareholder 
responses designed to minimize the problems of agent malfeasance). 
22 See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J .  FIN. EcoN. 305, 
308-10 (1976) (describing agency costs created by separation of ownership from 
control). 
23 One criticism that might be leveled at the literature on shareholder activism is 
its frequent failure to define or distinguish between different monitoring activities. 
See, e.g. , Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 3, at 813 n.3 (using the terms 
"monitoring" and "oversight" "interchangeably to refer to the various actions, direct 
and indirect, formal and informal, that institutional investors can take to assess 
corporate manager performance and to influence corporate actions"). Monitoring can 
run the gamut from actively analyzing corporate information and intelligently 
exercising the corporate franchise, to sponsoring shareholder proposals or making 
efforts to influence management policy through negotiations with management, to 
efforts to obtain board representation or effect a complete change in corporate control. 
See, e.g. , Robert D. Rosenbaum & Michael E. Korens, Institutional Shareholder 
Activism and Related Proposals for Legislative and Regulatory Changes to Corporate 
Governance Rules, 696 PLI/Corp 621 (PLI June 21, 1990) available in DIALOG 
(describing different types and degrees of institutional activism through use of recent 
examples). In addition, the threat or exercise of disciplinary measures, ranging from a 
full-scale proxy contest to initiation of derivative litigation, may be properly viewed as 
methods of monitoring management. Distinction between monitoring activities is 
important because different types of monitoring involve vastly different costs, present 
different types of risks to an investor, and presumably differ in their effectiveness in 
enhancing corporate performance. 
24 See, e.g., Dent, supra note 4, at 907-23 (discussing benefits of returning 
control of corporations to shareholders); cf. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation 
Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259 (1967) (explaining that public 
corporation is designed to separate ownership from management, thereby facilitating 
specialization). 
25 These mechanisms include the right of a shareholder under state corporation 
law to inspect corporate books and records, the shareholder's right to corporate 
information under the federal securities laws, the ability to replace directors and 
initiate changes in corporate governance through the voting process, and the use of 
derivative litigation to correct wrongdoing or recover damages. 
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monitoring requires the activist shareholder to spend money. 26 It will be 
rational for an investor to spend funds to monitor only when the expected 
returns generated by monitoring exceed its costs . In mathematical terms,27 
if r(m) is the return from monitoring activity m, and C(m) is the cost of 
monitoring,28 the investor will monitor only when r(m) - C(m) > 0. 
The traditional explanation for the failure of shareholder monitoring to 
produce efficiently run corporations is a collective action problem.  The 
growth of large public corporations and the development of a national 
securities market have led to an investment norm in which investors tend to 
diversify, that is, to own a small quantity of stock in a large number of 
companies . From the perspective of an individual investor, diversification 
can be justified by a variety of factors, including the reduction of risk. 
Diversified investors are less l ikely to encounter situations in which it is 
rational to expend funds to monitor their investments. This is because, 
while the return to an investor is a function of the quantity of stock owned, 
monitoring costs are largely unrelated to the size of the investment. 
Accordingly, if an investor has only a small stake in a company, the 
effect of monitoring will have to be enormous to yield the investor a 
sufficiently large return to justify the expense.29 This causes shareholders 
to forgo monitoring activities that would benet1t them as a group, because 
26 See, e.g. , Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate 
Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1820, 
1837 (1989) (describing costs associated with effective shareholder monitoring through 
the voting process as including the investment in the acquisition and processing of 
information necessary to evaluate the merits of the voting decision); Coffee, supra 
note 10, at 1339 n.235 (describing current cost of conducting a proxy campaign in 
opposition to management at between $2 million and $15 million, depending upon the 
size of the corporation and the specific proposal). Monitoring entails a variety of 
indirect costs as well, including, for example, the risk of business reprisals for 
opposing corporate management. /d. 
27 Although the mathematical model is of limited utility in explaining this simple 
preliminary concept, it is introduced here as a basis for subsequent development. 
28 Costs are expressed as a function of m because the cost of monitoring varies 
with the nature of the particular form of monitoring. For example, the cost associated 
with the intelligent exercise of the corporate franchise is considerably less than the 
cost of mounting a full-scale proxy contest. 
29 Small individual stakes make shareholder apathy rational because many 
monitoring activities, if conducted by small investors, will not affect corporate 
decisionmaking. For example, Professor Dent describes this "rational apathy" by 
institutional investors in connection with proxy voting by explaining that, if a 
shareholder cannot affect the outcome of a vote, a rational level of investment in 
voting is zero. See Dent, supra note 4, at 903. 
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no single shareholder can justify the cost of monitoring.30 Because the 
problem can be attributed to the inability of a large dispersed shareholder 
body to apportion the costs of monitoring within the collective group, it is 
described as a collective action problem.3 1 
In mathematical terms, we can see the effect of shareholder dispersion 
and diversification on the monitoring decision as follows. If a corporation 
were owned by a single shareholder, the entire return from monitoring, 
which we can designate R(m), would accrue to that shareholder. Thus, in 
the single shareholder scenario, R(m) equals r(m), the return to the 
shareholder. In a corporation with multiple shareholders, however, no 
single investor reaps the entire benefit of monitoring. Instead, returns 
accrue to each investor on a pro rata basis, reflecting that investor's 
ownership interest in the company. An investor who owns ten percent of 
the company, for example, will receive returns of (10%)(R(m)) . If we 
designate as k(i) the percentage ownership by the monitoring investor in 
company i, we can then distinguish returns to the investor, r(m), from 
returns to the group as follows : k(i)R(m) = r(m). 
The result is a collective action problem because, although an investor 
will monitor only in situations where k(i)R(m) - C(m) > 0, it would be 
socially beneficial for monitoring to occur whenever R(m)- C(m) > 0. If it 
were possible for shareholders to act collectively and to apportion the costs 
on a pro rata basis, monitoring would occur more frequently. Thus 
collective action problems explain the failure of investors to engage in the 
socially optimal level of monitoring activity. 
This model can be used to demonstrate why institutional activism 
offers the possibil ity of greater monitoring. Recent years have seen an 
overwhelming increase in the amount of stock held by institutional 
investors, both in absolute and relative terms .32 Because institutional stakes 
30 For a numerical illustration of this point, see Coffee, supra note 10, at 1285-
86 n.23. 
3 1 The difficulty in apportioning the costs of a collective good among the 
beneficiaries of that good is the classic collective action problem. Included in this 
concept is the related problem of free-riding, which results from the fact that 
beneficiaries of a collective good often cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefit 
even if they do not share in the costs of producing the good. For an extended 
discussion of the collective action problems presented by dispersed shareholder efforts 
to monitor corporate management, see Rock, supra note 2, at 454-63. 
32 For example, recent data published by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve shows that institutions now hold 54.2% of the $4.96 trillion market value of 
stock outstanding and that only 45.8% is held by individuals. The greatest relative 
increase in shareholdings is by private pension funds, and mutual funds, which 
together now own about a third of the outstanding equity. Institutions Hold Dominant 
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in corporations are typically larger than those held by individuals ,  
institutions will monitor more frequently .  Institutions can justify spending 
money to monitor because the gains that accrue to a large shareholder from 
monitoring more often exceed the costs of monitoring .33 
Other considerations strengthen this conclusion. It may cost 
institutional investors less to monitor due to their greater sophistication and 
superior access to information. 34 Because of their size and the quantity of 
resources they control , they may also have more influence with corporate 
management, making their monitoring activities more effective. The 
traditional model suggests that both these factors increase the number of 
situations in which the benefits of monitoring will exceed the costs. 
This model of institutional monitoring has gathered widespread 
support. 35 It has also generated proposals for legislative reform designed 
both to facilitate large shareholdings by institutions and to reduce the costs 
of activism. 36 The most notable response to these proposals has been the 
Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC)'s recent l iberalization of the 
federal proxy rules . After two sets of proposed amendments to the proxy 
rules and an extensive comment process, the SEC substantially amended 
the rules on October 16, 1992. The amendments were made in direct 
response to complaints by institutional investors that the proxy rules 
Stake in Equities Market, Fed Board Data Show, 25 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 943 (July 9, 
1993). The evolution and significance of the institutional investor is fairly new; as 
recently as 1965, individuals owned 84% of outstanding stock. !d. 
33 See, e.g. , Rock, supra note 2, at 459 (describing how increased 
institutionalization of shareholdings will allow shareholders to organize more easily to 
overcome collective action problems). 
34 One way in which institutions have already explored this process is by pooling 
information and monitoring activities through organizations like Institutional 
Shareholder Services. Professors Gilson and Kraakman urge an expansion of this 
approach, suggesting that institutions can significantly reduce collective action costs by 
joining together to support a new class of professional independent directors. Gilson & 
Kraakman, supra note 3. 
35 See, e.g. , Black, Agents Watching Agents, supra note 3, at 830-49; Alfred F. 
Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism ?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 117 
(1988); Dent, supra note 4; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3; Vanecko, supra note 
3, at 381-82; Black, Beyond Proxy Refonn, supra note 3, at 2. 
36 See, e.g. , Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Refonn, 18 J. CoRP. L. 1, 
49-52 (1992) (suggesting reforms to federal proxy rules to remove obstacles to 
institutional shareholder activism); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment 
Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSJC in the Corporate 
Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REv. 985, 1010 (1993) (proposing exemptions from 
Investment Company Act of 1940 to allow development of Managerial Strategic 
Investment Companies to engage in monitoring of publicly held corporations). 
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prevented them from communicating with one another and participating 
effectively in corporate governance.37 Among other things, the 
amendments eliminated the requirement that shareholders who actively 
participate in the proxy solicitation process report their participation to the 
SEC.38 According to the SEC, the amendments were " intended to facilitate 
shareholder communications and to enhance informed proxy voting, and to 
reduce the cost of compliance for all persons engaged in a proxy 
solicitation.  "39 
III. RATIONAL CHOICE AND THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR: 
THE COMPLICATION OF COMPETITION 
The foregoing analysis suggests that institutional investing is likely to 
provide a response to the collective action problem because it allows 
investors to overcome the cost barrier to active investing. This analysis has 
led many to predict an increase in relationship investing. This section 
suggests that, in spite of the advent of increased numbers of institutional 
investors with large ownership stakes, there is unlikely to be a revolution 
in corporate governance. Rather, the mathematical model, as described 
above, is deficient. It overstates the l ikelihood that institutional investors 
will expend significant resources on monitoring because it fails to capture 
accurately the rational decisionmaking process of some institutional 
investors . 
The central flaw with the model is that it assumes institutional 
investors seek to maximize absolute returns in making investment 
37 Indeed, the comprehensive reexamination of federal proxy regulation, which 
culminated in the proxy rule amendments, was initiated by a series of letters to the 
SEC from some of the most activist institutional investors. See Letter from Richard H. 
Koppes, CalPERS General Counsel, to Linda C. Quinn, Director, Division of 
Corporation Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission (Nov. 3 ,  1989), reprinted 
in INSTITlTfiONAL INvESTORS: PASSIVE FIDUCIARIES TO ACTMST OWNERS, at 454-76 
(1990); Letter from United Shareholders' Association to Edward H. Fleischman, 
Commissioner, Securities and Exchange Commission (Mar. 20, 1990) reprinted in 
INSTITlTfiONAL INvESTORS: PASSIVE FIDUCIARIES TO ACTMST OWNERS, at 485 (1990). 
38 See Regulation of Communications Among Shareholders, Exchange Act 
Release No. 3 1,326 [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,051 (Oct. 
16, 1992). For a description of the changes in proxy regulation effected by this 
release, see Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 
46 VAND. L. REv. 1129 , 1165-70 (1993). 
39 Regulation of Communications Among Securityholders, Exchange Act Release 
No. 30, 849 [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 85,002 (June 24, 
1992). 
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decisions . For many institutional investors, however, this assumption is not 
accurate. Many institutions are driven by competitive forces . Their 
performance is evaluated not in absolute terms , but based on whether they 
are able to generate a higher rate of return than the competition or than the 
market. 40 It may be better, in terms of competitive advantage and thus the 
abil ity to command future commitments of resources , for a firm to beat its 
competitors than to show some steady rate of return, even if absolute 
returns in each year are thereby reduced .41 
Although successful relationship investing may increase net present 
value, it leaves comparative performance unchanged. When investors 
decide whether to commit resources, they are more concerned with whether 
an institution performed better than others than with the return realized by 
the institution. If relationship investing does not create a competitive 
advantage, an institution has l ittle incentive to engage in it, even if it 
creates net present value. 
The focus on beating competitors operates at two levels . F irst, some 
institutional investors are evaluated-by customers, the market for their 
products, etc.-on the basis of their return relative to their competitors. A 
mutual fund presents the classic example of this phenomenon .  Mutual 
funds are evaluated almost exclusively on the basis of their relative total 
40 Mutual funds, for example, frequently advertise their performance in various 
fund rankings which assess performance on a competitive basis.  This practice has 
recently led the National Association of Securities Dealers to issue guidelines for the 
use of such rankings in advertisements. See, e.g. , NASD Hopes to Have Guidelines for 
Mutual Fund Ranldngs in Place Shortly, 26 Sec. Reg. L. Rep. 664-65 (May 6, 1994). 
41 The degree to which the search for competitive advantage influences 
investment patterns is substantial. Because the efficient capital market hypothesis 
explains that, over the long run, stock-picking techniques are unable systematically to 
outperform the market, and because stock trading generates greater transaction costs 
than an index-based buy and hold strategy, it appears irrational for institutional 
investors to engage in active trading strategies. See, e.g. , Lynn Stout, Are Stock 
Markets Costly Casinos ? Disagreement, Market Failure and Securities Regulation, VA. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 1995) (describing stock trading as a negative sum game 
resulting from market failure). Nonetheless, the proliferation of mutual funds and 
other institutions that persist in active trading suggests that the effort to beat rather 
than simply mirror market rates of return remains considerable. Moreover, the 
practitioner literature suggests that active selection can be profitable. See Darryll 
Hendricks et al. ,  Hot Hands in Mutual Funds: Short-Run Persistence of Relative 
Peifonnance, 1974-1988, 48 J. FIN. 93 (1993) (recounting prevalence of stock­
picking activity among mutual funds and evaluations of such funds based on relative 
performance). 
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return. 42 Individual investors may be concerned about mutual fund return 
in absolute terms in deciding whether to invest at all ,  but in choosing 
which fund, they focus on criteria such as a firm ranking near the top of its 
category or beating the relevant market indicators . Indeed, the relative 
performance of mutual funds is compiled on a regular basis, and many 
investors base their choice of mutual funds on a fund's relative 
performance. 43 
The same premise is used to evaluate the performance of the 
individuals who make decisions on behalf of an institutional investor. A 
mutual fund manager may be evaluated directly on the basis of whether the 
fund outperformed comparable funds, or indirectly on the extent to which 
the fund attracted customer investment. Even if managers are compensated 
based on the volume of money attracted rather than the profitability of the 
fund, the ability of customers to shift their assets continually to top 
performing funds will cause the rational fund manager to strive for short­
term superior relative performance. 44 
Other types of institutional investors are also susceptible to concerns 
about relative performance. Although the investor itself, such as a pension 
fund, may have no need to evaluate its returns on a relative basis, those 
who manage the investments of that institution may be judged by their 
performance relative to the market. For example, a public pension fund 
may have no need to beat market indicators in order to win 
investors/beneficiaries . If, however, the manager of that fund consistently 
achieves returns that are lower than relevant market indicators, he or she is 
l ikely to be replaced. Thus,  in terms of the individual investment decisions, 
the manager is again influenced by considerations of relative return. 
Thus,  many rational institutions will make investment decisions not 
with the goal of maximizing absolute return but rather of maximizing 
return relative to market indicators or other firms in the industry. This 
concern for competitive success creates a problem with activism. If an 
investor improves corporate performance by monitoring, it increases 
42 See Hendricks et al., supra note 41 (describing evaluation of mutual funds 
based on performance). 
43 See, e.g. , id. at 94 ("investors steer their money to funds that have performed 
well recently [relative to the competition]"). Indeed, customers can and do shift their 
money from fund to fund in response to reports of relative performance. This steers a 
larger quantity of assets to those managers who have performed well in the recent 
past. 
44 See id. ; see also Coffee, supra note 10, at 1319 (describing continual ability of 
investors to shift their funds from one mutual fund to another, with little notice, in 
search of the fund able to outperform its competitors). 
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returns to all other investors in the target company. This is the typical free 
rider problem with respect to those other investors who benefit from the 
fund's monitoring activity at no cost. But the problem goes beyond the 
collective action problem. 
An institution that invests monitoring resources in order to increase 
return will benefit less than its competitors because its total return is 
tempered by the expenditure of the costs of monitoring. Therefore, on a 
percentage basis, monitoring increases returns to the monitoring institution 
less than to passive investors and the market as a whole. By monitoring, 
the firm directly reduces its rate of return relative to other investors . 
Monitoring by a firm or an individual investment advisor that is judged on 
the basis of relative returns therefore may not be a rational economic 
choice. 
It is important to remember that spending money to monitor is 
primarily logical for those investors who seek to exceed market rates of 
return. If an investor can meet its investment objectives by duplicating the 
market rate of return, it can minimize both costs and risks through an 
appropriately diversified passive investment strategy such as indexing.45 
Accordingly, monitoring only makes sense as an effort to outperform the 
market. The question is whether, in the case of investors who are judged 
on a relative basis, monitoring can be a rational choice. 
We must adjust the mathematical model of monitoring, as used above, 
to address this question, because that model is based on the premise that 
investors seek to maximize absolute rather than relative returns . In other 
words , the model assumes that an investor will monitor whenever a dollar 
invested in monitoring generates a return of more than a dollar,  net of 
costs . By considering relative return, we have observed that this 
assumption is too simplistic. It may not be rational for an investor to 
undertake activities that net a positive return, if the return to non­
monitoring shareholders is greater. An investor judged on a relative basis 
is disadvantaged by undertaking monitoring activities that yield greater net 
returns to its competitors .46 
45 Thus Professor Coffee's concerns about exit, see infra note 56, carry more 
weight than he realized because monitoring requires investors to give up 
diversification in favor of stock-picking, to give up liquidity in favor of voice, and, as 
a result, to put themselves at a competitive disadvantage with their counterparts who 
index. 
46 The same is true with respect to the overall market rate of return. Professors 
Gilson and Kraakman make the argument that institutional investors will be best 
served by seeking system-wide improvements to the corporate governance structure 
that will increase market rates of return. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3. Such 
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In order to consider the effect of competition on the model, it is 
necessary to convert the returns generated to percentage terms because 
investment performance can only be compared by viewing returns on a 
percentage basis .  47 Such conversion involves quantifying the returns 
achieved by monitoring in terms of the percentage return generated over an 
arbitrary period of time. 48 If we designate the percentage return on an 
investment over some period of time as p,, we can calculate p, by dividing 
the absolute dollar amount of return by the amount of the investment. If the 
total amount of resources invested in investment i is reflected as A (i), then 
p,(i) = r(i)IA (i).49 The investor's investment return, U, on a total portfolio 
value of T, where T = I A (i), is, in relative terms, I r(i)IT. Put 
differently, the overall return is the weighted average of the investor's 
returns on individual investments, U = (IJ.J(i)A(i))II A(i). 
Thus the effect of monitoring on overall investment returns is directly 
related to the degree to which the investor's portfolio is concentrated in the 
subject corporation. Increasing the return on an individual investment in 
the portfolio through monitoring will have a progressively greater impact 
on the investor's overall investment returns to the extent that an increasing 
proportion of the investor's portfolio is devoted to that investment. In other 
words, monitoring is more effective, in terms of increasing portfolio 
returns on a percentage basis, when the monitored company represents a 
large portion of the monitoring investor's portfolio . 
Recal l ,  however, that the return to the monitoring investor must also 
reflect the costs of monitoring. This cost is not shared by other 
shareholders . Therefore the improvement on a percentage yield basis of an 
investment's performance, based on monitoring activity, is always going to 
be less for the monitoring investor than for nonmonitoring shareholders . If 
monitoring increases performance by ten percent, the monitoring 
improvements, however, will not improve any single investor's competitive position 
relative to the industry as a whole and are therefore unlikely objectives of investors 
subject to evaluation on relative terms. 
47 It is meaningless to try to evaluate an investment on the ground that it 
generates a return of $10. The implicit question is the amount of return in relationship 
to the investment size. Thus a $10 return on a $10 investment is a return of 100%, a 
very good return, while a $10 return on a $100,000 investment is a return of .01 %, a 
very poor rate. 
48 The relevant time period need not be specified for purposes of this analysis but 
could, for example, be the period of time over which an investor was evaluating the 
effect of its monitoring activity on performance. Obviously some time component is a 
necessary predicate for this evaluation-a 5% rate of return per month is significantly 
better than a rate of 5% per year. 
49 The reader will recall that r(i) is the return on investment i, in absolute terms.  
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shareholder always captures some return less than ten percent, because its 
return, and only its return, is reduced by the cost of monitoring. 
Monitoring, therefore, diminishes the institutional investor's returns 
relative to the market as a whole. Does this mean that a rational investor 
interested in relative returns will never monitor because that investor's 
returns will be improved by less than those of its competitors? The answer 
is no . The effect of monitoring on overall portfolio performance, as we 
saw above, is a function of two things : the increase in relative returns on 
that investment and the concentration of the investor's portfol io invested in 
the target company relative to the concentration of its competitors. We can 
reflect the investor's excess concentration in investment i, that is, the 
degree to which its portfolio concentration exceeds the concentration of its 
competitors , by A(i)IT - M(i)!Z where M(i) is th� total amount of resources 
invested in investment i by competitor institutions and Z is the total 
investment of competitor institutions . 50 Thus if ;.l (i) is the excess profit 
generated by monitoring investment i, the rational investor will monitor 
whenever p' (i)(A (i)IT - M(i)!Z) - C(m) > 0. 
In order for this formula to be satisfied, the monitoring shareholder 
must concentrate its portfolio substantially. If an investor effects profitable 
monitoring in a company in which it owns, proportionately, a larger stake 
than its competitors, the effect on its performance, relative to the effect on 
the performance of  competitors, will be larger. Thus, in that case, and only 
in that case, will the investor improve its relative position. 
Portfolio theory tells us that concentration subjects an investor to a 
large amount of unsystematic or alpha risk-the risk that results from firm­
specific variables . 5 1 Because this risk can be eliminated through 
diversification,52 it is an uncompensated risk; that is, unlike beta risk, the 
50 M (i)!Z reflects the overall percentage of competitor resources concentrated in 
investment i or target company i .  We might similarly evaluate an investor's 
concentration relative to the market as a whole. A benchmark for market 
concentration would be the percentage of a value-weighted market index, such as the 
Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500, represented by company i. 
5 1 The classic works on the relationship between risk and return and the ability to 
eliminate unsystematic risk through diversification are Franco Modigliani and Gerald 
A. Pogue, An Introduction to Risk and Return: Concepts and Evidence (pts. 1 & 2) , 30 
FIN. ANALYSTS J. , Mar.-Apr. 1974, at 68 (pt. 1), May-June 1974, at 69 (pt. 2). 
52 Indeed, most institutions hold broadly diversified portfolios for the explicit 
purpose of eliminating all unsystematic risk. Unsystematic risk, or unique risk, is that 
part of total risk that is unique to a company or industry; it can therefore be eliminated 
by diversification. See, e.g. , RICHARD A .  BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, 
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 136-3 8 (4th ed. 199 1) (explaining how 
diversification eliminates unsystematic risk) ; BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDoM WALK 
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market does not provide a superior return for investors who choose to bear 
alpha risk . Accordingly, concentration creates an additional cost for 
investors .53 Because firm-specific risk is a function of the degree of 
concentration, 54 we can represent it as an additional cost in the 
mathematical model : a(A(i)IT) . Our mathematical model now indicates that 
the rational investor will monitor if J.l '(i)(A(i}IT - M(i)!Z) - C(m) - a(A (i)IT) 
> 0. 
IV. RETHINKING THE PROMISE OF RELATIONSHIP INVESTING 
A. Further Thoughts on the Likelihood of Activism 
The foregoing model suggests that, for most rational institutional 
investors, the benefits of active monitoring do not outweigh the costs . A 
number of skeptics have suggested additional explanations why relationship 
investing is unlikely to reform corporate governance. 55 Although a detailed 
analysis of these concerns is beyond the scope of this Article, several 
scholars have criticized the traditional analysis of monitoring as 
understating the costs of institutional activism. These scholars argue that 
the costs of monitoring include both direct and indirect costs . The indirect 
costs include a loss of l iquidity, 56 costs of legal rules designed to constrain 
DoWN WALL STREET 223-27 (5th ed. 1990) (same) ; see also W.H. Wagner & S.C.  
Lau, The Effect of Diversification on Risk, 27 FIN. ANALYSTS J. Nov.-Dec. 197 1 ,  at 
48. 
53 To the degree that concentration increases the size of the average investment 
position, it also decreases liquidity, which creates additional cost. See, e.g. , Coffee, 
supra note 10, at 1288 (stating that investors face substantial price discounts in trying 
to sell large blocks of stock); Ira M. Millstein, On the Making of Pension Funds as 
"Patient Capitalists", DIREcrORS & BOARDS, Winter 1990, at 1 1 ,  15 (explaining that 
large blocks of stock create liquidity problems for pension funds) . 
54 The function is exponential rather than linear. Accordingly, small amounts of 
diversification can greatly reduce an investor's alpha risk. 
55 Articles expressing skepticism about the likelihood or value of institutional 
monitoring include Coffee, supra note 10; Edward B .  Rock, Controlling the Dark Side 
of Relational Investing, 15  CARDOzo L. REv. 987 (1994) [hereinafter Rock, 
Controlling the Dark Side] ; Rock, supra note 2; Roe, supra note 14; Romano, supra 
note 13 .  
56 In his classic piece on  the subject, Professor Coffee explains that an investor's 
choice to exercise control reduces the liquidity of the investor's holdings. Coffee, 
supra note 10. Thus an investor is faced with a choice of whether to exercise greater 
voice through monitoring activities or to retain the maximum amount of liquidity 
possible. See, e.g. , id. at 1287 ("[A]ny attempt by institutional investors in the United 
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institutional activism, 57 risk of management retaliation, 58 and public 
States to exercise control over corporate managements will entail a probable sacrifice 
of this liquidity, which may be an unacceptable cost to them. ") ;  id. at 13 1 8-28 
(discussing various structural constraints that force institutional investors to choose 
between "exit" and "voice") . Many institutional investors are unable, because of their 
structure, to accept diminished liquidity. For example, open end mutual funds must 
stand ready to liquidate holdings at any time in order to meet customer redemption 
requests. /d. at 1318 .  Even for investors who can accept less liquidity, the reduction 
represents an additional cost of monitoring. Indeed, Professor Coffee concludes that 
the costs of monitoring make it unlikely that investors will voluntarily increase their 
monitoring activities at the expense of liquidity and offers, as an alternative 
explanation for recent increases in shareholder activism, the suggestion that some 
institutions have already sacrificed liquidity by virtue of the size or nature of their 
shareholdings. /d. at 1288-89. For those investors, because exit is no longer an 
option, monitoring does not impose this additional cost. 
57 Legal rules can restrict institutional monitoring in two ways. First, legal rules 
of general application can limit the role of shareholders in corporate decisionmaking 
or the ability of shareholders to act collectively. An example of the former is the 
regulation of shareholder voting under the federal proxy rules. Although, as described 
above, the federal proxy regulations were recently amended to facilitate institutional 
activism, the rules continue to limit the ability of shareholders to affect corporate 
decisionmaking. For example, the SEC's application of Rule 14a-8 has limited the 
ability of institutional investors to propose policy changes through the shareholder 
proposal process; the SEC has determined that many such proposals are not proper 
matters for shareholder action because they relate to the ordinary business operations 
of the corporation. See Fisch, supra note 38 ,  at 1 155-62 (discussing SEC 's application 
of the exclusion for proposals relating to ordinary business operations). Similarly the 
proxy rules require institutions that wish to propose candidates for board positions to 
conduct a separate proxy solicitation, thereby increasing the costs of challenging 
management control of the nomination process. See id. at 1 162-65 (discussing 
restrictions imposed by federal proxy regulation on direct nomination of directors by 
shareholders) ; see also Bebchuk & Kahan, supra note 4, at 1073 {describing how state 
law rules on reimbursement of proxy contest expenses favor management over 
stockholder/challengers and obstruct socially beneficial challenges) . 
The reporting requirements under § 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act have 
also been criticized as a constraint on institutional activism. The statute and the SEC 
rules thereunder apply to persons who purchase or decide to hold as a group more 
than five percent of a corporation's shares and require such persons to disclose their 
identity and intentions. Because the regulations define as a group , for disclosure 
purposes, investors who decide to act jointly with respect to voting their securities or 
otherwise influencing the control of the corporation, the filing requirement applies to 
efforts by investors to engage in collective action. In addition to actual filing, the 
requirement has been viewed as a burden on shareholder activism because it provides 
notice to the corporation of potentially hostile group action by shareholders and 
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because of the possibility that the corporation will respond with litigation. A related 
analysis suggests that it is possible to apply "controlling person" liability under the 
federal securities laws to institutional investors who actively monitor. See Conard, 
supra note 35. 
Second, legal rules can regulate the investment activity of particular types of 
institutional investors by requiring a certain degree of diversification which limits the 
ability of an investor to invest on a concentrated basis, requiring that the investor limit 
its activity to passive investments, or both. Federal banking laws, for example, 
prevent banks from acquiring large blocks of corporate stock and explicitly require 
passivity with respect to these investments. Banks are prohibited by law from owning 
stock directly, although bank holding companies are permitted to own up to five 
percent of the voting shares of a nonbank. See, e.g. , Banking Act of 1933 (Glass­
Steagall), § 5(c), 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988) .  For a more detailed discussion of legal 
limitations on equity ownership and participation by banks, see Aleta G. Estreicher, 
Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. 
REv. 513 ,  567-68 (1993); Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in 
Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993) [hereinafter Roe, 
Di.ffere nces] . 
The Investment Company Act of 1940 imposes similar limitations on 
concentration and activism on mutual funds. Commentators have explained that 
similar restrictions may be imposed on other types of institutional investors by 
insurance regulations, ERISA, state pension regulations or antitrust law. See, e.g. , 
Estreicher, supra, at 590-91 (describing legal limitations imposed by insurance 
regulations and Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act) ; Romano, supra note 
13 ,  at 800 (describing state law limits on percentage ownership by public pension 
funds of company's outstanding stock); see also Bernard S. Black, Shareholder 
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1990); Helen Garten, Institutional 
Investors and the New Financial Order, 44 RUTGERS L. REv. 585, 6 13-20 (1992); 
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 9 1  COLUM. L. REv. 
10 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, Political Theory] . For example, in many states common 
stock holdings are completely ignored for the purpose of determining if an insurance 
company has sufficient capital to satisfy regulatory requirements. See, e.g. , N.Y. INs. 
LAW § 1402 (McKinney 1985); CAL. INs. CODE § 1 170 (West 1993). 
58 See Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, Active Investing in the U.S. Equity Market: 
Past Performance and Future Prospects, Report for the California Public Employees' 
Retirement System, 39-43 (Jan. 1 1 ,  1993) [hereinafter Gordon Group Study] 
(identifying risks of defeat and management retaliation associated with nonnegotiated 
or hostile activism). Certain types of institutions have traditionally seen themselves as 
affiliated with management and management's interests. Private pension funds serve as 
the primary example of this phenomenon; because pension fund managers owe their 
existence and selection to the management of public companies, they have a strong 
promanagement loyalty or bias that is difficult to overcome. See, e.g. , Taking the 
Offensive, INSTITUTIONAL INvESTOR, Dec. 1987, at 101 (noting that survey of 
corporate pension money managers revealed that only 6 . 8 %  claimed to have resisted 
advice from corporate pension officers regarding how to vote pension fund proxies) . 
1 028 OHIO STA TE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55 : 1 009 
approbation. 59 
In addition, the structure of the institutional investor itself reflects a 
separation of ownership and control that creates agency costs within the 
institution.6° In other words, institutional investors have, themselves, 
begun to succumb to a corporate mode of operating, in which those who 
exercise investment and voting authority are distinct from, and only 
Banks and insurance companies operate within similar constraints, in part because they 
frequently look to corporate management for other business relationships, which active 
monitoring might jeopardize. The structural bias of these relationships suggests that, 
although these institutions may be able to engage in negotiated or management­
friendly monitoring activities, they are unlikely to undertake activism of a more 
hostile or disciplinary nature. See, e.g. , James A. Brickley et al. ,  Ownership Structure 
and Voting on Antitakeover Amendments, 20 J .  FIN. ECON. 267 (1988) (demonstrating 
that institutional investors that have additional business relationships with target 
companies are more likely to support management-sponsored proposals) . Even those 
institutions that appear structurally resistant to management pressure are reluctant to 
challenge management. See Diana B .  Henriques, Fidelity 's Secret Agent Man, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 27, 199 1 ,  § 3 ,  at 1 (describing efforts by the Fidelity group of mutual 
funds to maintain reputation as friendly long-term investors); see also Robert C .  
Pozen, Institutional Investors: The Reluctant Activists, HARv. Bus. REv.,  Jan.-Feb . 
1994, at 140 (suggesting that the threat of litigation by a portfolio company imposes a 
substantial and unpredictable cost on activism). 
59 The best example of public resistance to institutional activism is the response to 
the takeover environment of the 1980s, in which institutional investors were portrayed 
as destructive, greedy, and concerned exclusively with short-term gains, and a variety 
of legal reforms were proposed to prevent Wall Street from destroying the U.S.  
corporation through activism. See, e.g. , Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A 
New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58  U. 
CHI. L. REv. 187, 205- 13 (1991) (proposing to eliminate hostile tender offers and 
limit director elections to once every five years to address problems caused by 
increasing institutional activism and short-termism). Moreover, the very institutions 
typically viewed as likely activists because of their freedom from management 
loyalties may be constrained by the adverse reaction of their "other constituencies" to 
activism. For example, Professor Barnard relates the conflict and political fallout 
created when the State of Wisconsin Investment Board submitted a management­
critical shareholder proposal to General Motors at a time when General Motors was 
considering expanding operations and providing additional jobs in Wisconsin. Jayne 
W. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, 69 N.C.  L. 
REv. 1 135, 1 141  n.39 (1991).  For an extensive discussion of the political constraints 
on activism by public pension funds, see Romano, supra note 13 . 
60 See Institutional Investors and Corporate America: Conflicts and Resolutions: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing 
and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong . ,  1 st Sess. 2-3 (Oct. 3 ,  1989) (prepared by Carolyn 
Kay Brancato at the request of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities) . 
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marginally accountable to , the beneficiaries . 61 Indeed, it is l ikely that 
agency costs are greater for institutional investors than for corporations 
because many of the structures designed to provide accountabil ity at the 
corporate level-such as the possibility of beneficiary exit, the discipline of 
proxy contests and takeover battles, and the checks provided by 
shareholder voting power-are absent in most institutional structures . 62 
Thus, in the view of the skeptics, activist monitoring by institutional 
investors is even less l ikely to occur. This conclusion is supported by 
examining the recent evidence of institutional activism. Although both the 
popular and academic press have lauded the rise in active participation by 
institutional shareholders and proclaimed the "big impact" of relationship 
investing on the "running of American business, "63 reports of shareholder 
monitoring may be overstated .64 
First, institutions are, for the most part, taking only the small step of 
deciding to read proxy statements and to exercise the right to vote. 65 
6 1 Professor Coffee cites public pension funds as an example of institutional 
investors that are particularly unaccountable to their beneficiaries because of their 
size, organizational structure, and the dispersion of their beneficiaries. See Coffee, 
supra note 10, at 1335-36; see also Rock, supra note 2, at 452 (explaining that 
increasing concentration of shareholding raises problems of increased agency costs 
within the institutional investor). 
62 See Coffee, supra note 10,  at 1283 n.21 (describing various reasons why 
agency costs will be higher at the institutional investor level than within the corporate 
management structure) . 
The creation of shareholder advisory committees, a monitoring tool that has 
received recent attention, creates yet another layer of agency costs by placing an 
additional set of agents between the institutional investors and the boards of portfolio 
companies. See Barnard, supra note 59, at 1 166-67. 
63 Dickson, supra note 6 .  
64  For example, there has been widespread reporting of  institutional activism at 
A&P and Paramount. A&P is 53 % owned by a German retailing group , however, 
making protests by institutional investors somewhat futile. Moreover, in spite of some 
furor about Paramount's executive pay policy, led by Wisconsin's public pension 
fund, the Paramount directors were re-elected with more than 9 8 %  of the vote cast. 
/d. 
6S Further attention to and exercise of voting rights is clearly one area in which 
institutional investors have become more active, both in the United States and abroad. 
See, e.g. , James Kim, Campbell Puts Heat on Other Companies, USA TODAY, July 
16,  1993 , at B1  (describing decision by Campbell Soup Company and a small group of 
other private corporate pension funds to exercise their proxy voting power critically 
with respect to issues of corporate governance) ; John Plender, Survey of Pension Fund 
Investment, FIN. TIMES , May 6 ,  1993, at VII (describing evolution from system in 
which four out of five pension fund managers did not exercise their voting rights as a 
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Although more frequent and critical66 voting by institutional investors may 
affect management decisions indirectly, its primary effect is likely to be 
limited to rejecting antitakeover provisions and supporting precatory 
shareholder proposals that advocate more responsible exercise of 
management power.67 These activities do not naturally lead toward the 
model of relationship investing in which management and institutions work 
hand in hand to forge corporate policy. Nor do they promise increased 
disciplining of management beyond the highly publicized takeover arena. 
Voting, even in opposition to management's  recommendations, is unlikely 
to effect substantial changes in management behavior. 68 
Second, few institutional investors appear to be going further. 69 To the 
extent that monitoring involves the use of more activist efforts to influence 
corporate policy, institutions do not appear convinced that the game is 
worth the candle. 70 Pension funds are reportedly leery of the risks 
matter of course to system in which the Cadbury report recommends positive use of 
voting rights by institutional investors); Leslie Wayne, Seeking Investment with 
Principle, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1993 , at D 1  (describing "Avon letter" issued by 
Department of Labor in 1988, which described corporate proxies as a pension plan 
asset that plan managers were required to take seriously) . 
66 There are extensive press reports of efforts by institutional shareholder 
organizations to disseminate information designed to motivate active shareholdership. 
See, e.g. , Martin Dickson, 'Poor performers ' List Gives Ammunition to Institutions, 
FIN. TIMES, Oct. 8 ,  1993 , at 25 (describing list prepared by Council of Institutional 
Investors identifying the poorest performing companies in America) . Beyond 
generating publicity, however, it is not clear that institutions are making much use of 
this information. 
67 See, e.g. , American Corporate Governance,· Shareholders Call the Plays, 
ECONOMIST,  Apr. 24, 1993 , at 83 (describing increase in efforts by institutions to 
reform corporate governance through proxy voting and informal negotiations and 
listing targeted changes as including removal of staggered boards, golden handcuffs 
and poison pills) ; Dean Foust, Who 's in Charge Here ?, Bus. WK. ,  Mar. 19 ,  1 990, at 
38-39 (describing institutional activism with respect to shareholder proposals on 
poison pills, golden parachutes and staggered boards) . 
68 This situation is aggravated by the legal and institutional limitations on the 
effectiveness of shareholder voting. Even under a campaign in which institutions 
overwhelmingly vote in opposition to management's slate of directors, for example, in 
the absence of a competing slate , the directors will nonetheless be elected. q: Joseph 
A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside 
the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1993). 
69 See Gordon Group Study, supra note 58, at 44 ("One difficulty in measuring 
the value effects of [relationship investing] is that remarkably little of it has in fact 
occurred to date in the U.S. market. ") .  
70 See, e.g. , Meaningful Relationships, EcoNOMIST, June 26, 1993 , at 82 
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associated with relationship investing,71 and institutions that engage in 
stock-picking investment strategies also appear skeptical . 72 
Indeed, it is possible to explain the rapid growth in institutional 
2-·.::tivism as simply a second order institutional response to the takeover era. 
Institutional activism was first observed in the context of corporate control 
transactions, in which institutions were criticized for their short-term 
orientation.73 Takeovers were defended, however, as the means by which 
the stock market monitored corporate management: inefficient management 
caused declining stock prices that would create a takeover opportunity. 74 
The combination of state antitakeover statutes and court-sanctioned 
antitakeover devices substantially contributed to the decline of takeovers in 
the late 1980s . The rise in "institutional participation in corporate 
governance directly coincides with this decline. 75 The correlation is clear. 
To the extent that takeovers provided a check on management inefficiency, 
the advent of these defensive measures should have operated to depress 
stock prices artificially .76 Accordingly, it would be rational for institutions 
(questioning whether relationship investing may be too risky for institutional 
investors) . 
7l A study of the value of shareholder activism conducted by the Gordon Group 
on behalf of CalPERS concluded that although active investments had the potential to 
generate superior returns, they presented a variety of risks for an investor like 
CalPERS, many of which risks could not readily be quantified. Gordon Group Study, 
supra note 58 .  
72 American Corporate Governance; Shareholders Call the Plays, supra note 67, 
at 83 . 
73 See, e.g. , The Impact of Institutional Investors on Corporate Governance, 
Takeovers and the Capital Markets: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the 
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, lOlst Cong. , 1st Sess. 228 
(Oct. 3 ,  1989) (statement of Sen. Terry Sanford) (stating that concentration of stock in 
the hands of institutional investors with short-term focus was "a major cause of the 
rampant wave of hostile, highly leveraged transactions that we have seen sweep across 
the country in the past 10 years"); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 59 , at 205- 13 .  
74 See, e.g. , Frank H.  Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel , The Proper Role of a 
Target 's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1 16 1 ,  
1 1 87-88 (1981);  Ronald Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case 
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819 ,  841 (1981);  Henry 
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. EcoN. 1 10 (1965). 
75 See Barnard, supra note 59, at 1 152-53 (describing development of 
institutional activism in late 1980s). 
76 The empirical evidence is mixed but suggests that many antitakeover statutes 
and other devices are associated with reductions in stock price and/or corporate value. 
See, e.g. , W. Thomas Connor, Note, Sword or Shield: The Impact of Third­
Generation State Takeover Statutes on Shareholder Wealth, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
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to focus their efforts on removing impediments to socially beneficial 
takeovers, 77 both because removal would increase stock prices and because 
restoring the market's monitoring function would obviate the need for more 
extensive direct monitoring efforts by investors .78 Thus, activism in
· 
the 
area of takeovers may be a special case79 and may even be consistent with 
diminished rather than increased institutional interest in activism. 80 
958, 984 (1989) (finding "substantial evidence that [these] third-generation control 
share acquisition acts . . .  have adversely affected shareholder wealth"); Gregg Jarrell 
& Annette Poulsen,  Shark Repellents and Stock Prices: The Effects of Antitakeover 
Amendments Since 1980, 19 J. FIN. EcoN. 127 (1987) (correlating abnormal negative 
returns with supermajority amendments and relating more harmful amendments to 
corporations with a lower percentage of institutional ownership); S .  Linn & J .  
McConnell , An Empirical Investigation of "Antitakeover" Amendments on Common 
Stock Prices, 1 1  J. FIN. EcoN. 361 ,  389-9 1 (1983) (finding inconclusive effect on 
stock price); see also Kenneth B. Davis, Jr. ,  Epilogue: The Role of the Hostile 
Takeover and the Role of the States, 1988 Wis . L. REv. 49 1 ,  493-500 (summarizing a 
variety of empirical studies) . For summaries of the debate, see also ROMANO, supra 
note 19 ,  at 60-72; Bernard S .  Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: 
The Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REv. 895, 9 1 1-12 (1992) . 
77 See Mark R. Wingerson & Christopher H. Dorn, Institutional Investors in the 
U.S. and the Repeal of Poison Pills: A Practitioner 's Perspective, 1992 COLUM. Bus.  
L. REV. 223 , 233-34 (describing . topics addressed by most recent institutional 
shareholder initiatives as including "rescissions of poison pills, implementation of 
confidential voting procedures, reduction in golden parachutes, installation of anti­
greenmail provisions, review of executive compensation,  opting out of state takeover 
statutes, repealing classified boards of directors . . . .  ") (footnote omitted); Rosenbaum 
& Korens, supra note 23 (describing most common institutional investor sponsored 
shareholder proposals and related efforts addressing greenmail, antitakeover statutes, 
poison pills, and confidential voting); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, 
Markets and Courts, 9 1  COLUM. L. REv. 193 1 ,  1971 n . l48 (1991) (describing how, in 
response to intense lobbying by institutional investors , Pennsylvania modified 
"draconian" antitakeover statute and majority of large publicly traded companies 
opted out of one or more statutory provisions) ; see also supra note 67. 
78 But see Rock, supra note 2, at 487 n . 164 (citing E. FLAX, VOTING BY 
INSTITUTIONAL INvESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE QUESTIONS IN THE 1985 
PROXY SEASON 1 (1985)) (finding limited success by institutions in defeating 
antitakeover proposals; in study of more than 450 antitakeover charter amendment 
proposals, only 19 were defeated) . 
79 The United Shareholders Association has focused its agenda regarding 
shareholder activism directly on removing antitakeover provisions that impede market 
discipline of corporate governance. Robert Weisman, Shareholders ' Group Takes Aim 
at Anti-Takeover Provisions, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 7, 199 1 ,  at 3 .  
80 See, e.g. , Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, Information, Ownership Structure, 
and Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Shareholder-Sponsored Corporate Governance 
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Moreover, even the forerunners in the area of institutional activism 
appear to be reducing their efforts . CalPERS , probably the most visibly 
active institutional investor, dramatically reduced the number of 
shareholder initiatives it sponsored during the last proxy season. Recently 
it announced a decision not to invest in the LENS fund, a fund organized 
by Robert Monks for the purpose of employing active investing 
techniques. 8 I This decision came as a major setback to Monks, who had 
called CalPERS the "best prospect [he] had in a world where new ideas are 
difficult to sel l .  "82 According to another recent report, John Biggs, 
chairman of TIAA-CREF, one of the country's  largest institutional 
investors, which had participated in a number of efforts to pressure 
managers to reorganize their businesses, has stated that he is not interested 
in seeking further "high-profile examples of muscle flexing. "83 
The promotion of activism has led to the development of a small group 
of specialist funds, however, which seek superior returns through self­
conscious activism. 84 The investment plans of these funds include 
concentrating investment in a l imited number of companies and using 
Proposals, 48 J. FIN. 697 (1993) (finding empirical evidence of higher institutional 
support for shareholder proposals to rescind poison pills and relax supermajority 
requirements and characterizing such support ·as a response to state law and 
management action to reduce shareholder rights in the takeover context over the past 
decade). 
8 1 See Meaningful Relationships, supra note 70 (describing decision by CalPERS 
not to invest in LENS fund). For a more detailed description of the LENS fund and 
similar funds, see infra note 84. 
82 Susan Pulliam, Calpers Won 't Invest in Activist 's Fund, WALL ST. J . , June 22, 
1993 , at C l .  According to a press report in June, Richard Monks pitched the LENS 
fund to more than 60 pension funds, but all rejected the opportunity to participate in 
relationship investing. Leslie Wayne, Money Manager 's 'Reality Check ', N.Y. TIMES, 
June 22, 1993 , at D l .  The article suggests that competing relationship investing funds 
are having similar fundraising problems. Id. 
83 Michael Quint, Teachers ' Pension Fund Asks for Diverse Boards, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 6, 1993 , at D6. 
84 The funds include the LENS fund, managed by Robert Monks; Corporate 
Partners, an investment fund managed by Lazard Freres; Allied Investment Partners, 
sponsored by Dillon Read; and the 1 8 1 8  Fund, sponsored by Brown Brothers 
Harriman. See, e.g. , Wayne, supra note 82 (describing size, sponsorship, and 
investment objectives of the four funds). The funds offer the opportunity for larger 
institutions to invest in activism indirectly by committing resources as passive 
investors in the funds. See, e.g. , Allen R. Myerson, Pension Funds Join in 
Turnaround Venture, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 2, 1993 , at D l .  Of course, engaging in 
relationship investing by proxy through the use, by institutions, of an investment in a 
specialist fund, creates an additional layer of agency relationships. 
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activism to generate improved returns in those companies . 85 Because the 
funds are concentrated, they meet the criteria of the model for which 
monitoring is a rational decision. For these funds, monitoring has a much 
greater effect on overall returns than it does for diversified investors . 86 
Thus the funds are able to distinguish themselves from competitors. The 
distinction can operate, however, in either direction. If the monitoring 
improves firm performance, the fund will do exceptionally wel l .  If the 
monitoring is unsuccessful , or if one of the targets experiences unrelated 
problems, the fund's concentration in that company is l ikely to result in a 
greatly inferior return. 
Do these funds represent the future for institutional investors? And 
should legal reforms along the l ines of the amendments to the federal proxy 
rules be extended, both to facil itate activism and to encourage institutional 
investors to employ special ist funds as investment vehicles? In order to 
answer those questions, it is necessary to consider further the value of 
institutional monitoring. 87 
B.  The Value of Activism 
A second type of criticism questions whether relationship investing is 
capable of improving corporate performance. That is, will activism add 
value to corporations? The empirical evidence on this subject is l imited . 88 
85 See Gordon Group Study, supra note 58 (describing investment objectives of 
four specialist funds); Wayne, supra note 82,  at 1 (same); Dobrzynski, supra note 5 
(describing three specialist funds and their stated objectives) . 
86 A specialist fund typically invests in five to ten portfolio companies. By 
contrast, most institutional investors own hundreds of portfolio companies. See, e.g. , 
Dickson, supra note 66 (describing TIAA-CREF as owning stock in 1500 companies) . 
TIAA-CREF's efforts to monitor a single portfolio company, unlike those of a 
specialist fund, are therefore likely to have an insubstantial impact on its overall 
returns. 
87 For example, Professors Gilson and Kraakman suggest an expansion of the 
approach of the specialist funds through the use of MSICs. They define an MSIC as a 
"publicly-traded financial intermediary . . . that pursues a core strategy of making 
large and active equity investments in a small portfolio of public companies. "  Gilson 
& Kraakman, supra note 36, at 985, 992. Although Gilson and Kraakman advocate 
the use of MSICs as an incremental means of achieving the superior monitoring 
associated with relationship investing, they acknowledge that the primary concern with 
adopting legal reforms to encourage MSICs is the possibility that MSICs would 
appropriate value for themselves and would fail to add real value to their portfolio 
companies. /d. at 1004. 
88 In part, this reflects the difficulty of measuring the effect of monitoring on 
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In 1993 , the Gordon Group conducted an extensive study of the monitoring 
activities and returns of four activist funds in an effort to determine 
whether active investing could provide significantly above-market rates of 
return. 89 The evidence from the study was largely inconclusive. 90 
The study did conclude that there was strong evidence that active 
investment strategies were "capable of leading to significant value 
increases, "91 but it distinguished between negotiated, "friendly, "  
transactions and nonnegotiated activism such as proxy initiatives . It found 
that the strongest evidence of the value of relationship investing was 
presented by nonnegotiated voting initiatives by institutional investors, and 
that evidence was "more qualified" on the value effects of friendly 
relationship investments . 92 
Three of the four funds studied , however, l imit their investments to 
friendly negotiated transactions and will not take a position hostile to 
existing management. The Gordon Group study identified "mixed value 
effects" from friendly relationship investments and hypothesized that the 
profitability of these investments may depend in large part on the identity 
of the investor. 93 
There are obvious reasons for institutions to prefer negotiated 
transactions; l imiting participation to negotiated settings eliminates a 
number of the downside risks associated with shareholder activism.94 In 
particular, friendly transactions are unlikely to generate the political 
repercussions associated with hostile monitoring activities . Thus, friendly 
transactions are more palatable both in the context of a particular company 
corporate performance. Many shareholder initiatives, such as increasing the 
percentage of outside directors on corporate boards or linking executive compensation 
to corporate returns may be beneficial even if they cannot be directly linked to 
changes in stock price. Pozen, supra note 58.  Moreover, even when institutional 
activism is followed by increased stock price, it is difficult to conclude that the 
activism caused the increase. Pozen suggests, for example, that the claimed success of 
the LENS fund in pressuring Sears to change its policies did not cause Sears' returns 
to differ significantly from the S&P 500 except on the day following the 
announcement of a change in policy. /d. 
89 Gordon Group Study, supra note 58 .  
90 An empirical analysis of  the benefits of  monitoring for public pension funds 
found that " [l]ittle [could] be concluded concerning the effect of corporate governance 
activism on fund performance . "  Romano, supra note 13 ,  at 830. 
9 1 Gordon Group Study, supra note 58, at 44. 
92 /d. 
93 /d. 
94 See id. at 39-43 (describing reduced risk associated with negotiated 
investments). 
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and within the context of the legal and structural regime. 95 Unfortunately,  
the evidence does not suggest that friendly transactions actually increase 
firm value. The very fact that a friendly transaction is negotiated between 
the investor and the target company presents the potential for abuse of the 
relationship to generate private gains for the investor rather than gains to 
common shareholders. 96 
Professor Bernard Black conducted the other major examination of the 
empirical evidence on the value of institutional monitoring. In a recent 
article, Professor Black analyzed a variety of studies on the relationship 
between active investment strategies such as block acquisitions, control 
transactions, and proxy initiatives and shareholder returns .97 He concluded 
that evidence of the value of institutional monitoring was quite l imited, 
although there was "some direct evidence that large outside shareholders 
do valuable monitoring, or at least that their presence correlates with 
improved performance. "98 
Importantly ,  Professor Black identified a number of methodological 
problems with existing studies of the value of institutional monitoring that 
also apply to the Gordon Group study. These problems include small 
sample size, failure to control for the signaling effect of institutional 
investor purchases and for the effect of outside factors on stock price, and 
inability to design studies that examine the effect of investor oversight as 
opposed simply to investor presence. 99 This last point is particularly 
problematic: it means that the studies do not provide evidence as to 
whether an investor's participation in decisionmaking, the key element of 
relationship investing, is responsible for improving corporate performance. 
Indeed, a serious question about the value of relationship investing 
95 Corporations have successfully created major backlashes against investors who 
seek to exercise too much control in an unfriendly manner. The activities of financial 
conglomerates like the old House of Morgan, for example, led to a variety of legal 
restrictions on the ability of banks to exerc
.
ise control over portfolio companies. Most 
recently, the involvement of institutional investors in encouraging corporate takeovers 
led to criticism that investors were destroying U.S. business in favor of short-term 
profits and generated a variety of state anti takeover statutes. 
96 See discussion of private gains infra part IV.C. 
97 Black, supra note 76, at 917-27. 
98 /d. at 897. 
99 /d. at 917-27. The success of the Brown Brothers Harriman 1 8 1 8  Fund 
provides some anecdotal evidence that the presence of a large investor may contribute 
to increased returns even when the investor does not engage in monitoring. The Fund 
takes large but noncontrolling stakes in companies that it perceives as undervalued but 
well-managed and thus not in need of active monitoring. Returns from the first of two 
such funds have averaged more than 25 % annually. Wayne, supra note 82, at D22. 
1994] RELATIONSHIP INVESTING 1037 
concerns the competence of institutional investors as corporate 
decisionmakers . Apart from the question of whether institutions have the 
abil ity to influence, it is not clear that they have the necessary expertise to 
improve performance. Particularly with respect to more intrusive 
participation, such as setting corporate policy, defining l imitations on 
capital expenditures, and selecting directors and management, there is l ittle 
reason to believe that the individuals who exercise voting power on behalf 
of institutional investors will be able to do better than existing 
management. In this respect, comparing activism by institutional investors 
to the guidance provided by individuals such as Warren Buffett is 
misleading. 100 
Most fund managers have l ittle experience in operating industrial 
corporations . Moreover, it is frequently difficult to distinguish poor 
corporate performance due to management defects from problems beyond 
the control of the corporation such as industry-wide declines or 
technological changes . Many of the "underperforming" companies that 
have been targeted for institutional activism have been experiencing major 
business problems for a number of years and have been unable to turn their 
performance around in spite of aggressive strategic changes . 101 Under these 
circumstances, it is hard to understand how a group of civil servants , 
bankers, and investment advisors will make the corporation perform 
better. 102 
A recent example is the troubled performance of Eastman Kodak 
Company. Kodak has been one of the investments targeted by the LENS 
fund 103 and other institutional activists and has been unable to improve its 
performance in spite of persistent pressure by outside investors . Kodak's 
attempts to respond have included numerous restructurings as well as 
personnel changes designed to invigorate the company with new 
leadership . 104 To date, these efforts have not satisfied critics who claim 
100 See Dobrzynski , supra note 5 (citing Buffett's counseling and board positions 
on many of his portfolio companies as evidence of the existence and profitability of 
relationship investing) . 
p 
10 1 See, e.g. , Rohatyn supra note 5 (questioning ability of institutional investors 
to anticipate corporate performance problems and identify appropriate solutions). 
102 See William Taylor, Can Big Owners Make a Big Difference ?, HARv. Bus. 
REv.,  Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 70, 81 (questioning whether institutional investors have the 
expertise to propose business solutions for troubled companies) . 
103 Wayne, supra note 82, at D22. 
104 For a chronicle of developments at Kodak over the last year, see Mark 
Maremont & Elizabeth Lesly, Getting the Picture, Bus. WK. ,  Feb. 1 ,  1993 , at 24; 
Eric D. Randall, Whitmore: 'We will deliver ', USA TODAY, May 13 ,  1993 , at B2; 
Change 's Pace Costs Kodak CEO, CHI. TRIB . ,  Aug. 7,  1993 , at 1 (describing 
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Similarly, recent news reports have described the problems of stagnant 
revenues and earnings at Borden, Inc . 106 Although a variety of institutions 
have contacted Borden's management and offered advice on how to 
improve corporate performance, there is l ittle consensus, even among the 
investors, about what steps to take. 107 Although investor activism may 
pressure a corporation into taking steps that management had identified as 
necessary but resisted for personal or political reasons , cases l ike Kodak 
and Borden illustrate that it is less likely that investors will be able to 
identify the means to improve poor performance. 
C. Private Gains 
The possible divergence of an institutional investor's interests from 
those of other shareholders creates a second reason for concern about the 
abil ity of institutions to act as effective monitors . 108 A decision that 
maximizes value from the perspective of the institution might not be 
optimal from the perspective of other investors . 109 The fact that a corporate 
institutional investor complaints leading to radical restructuring efforts and selection of 
Christopher Steffen as chief financial officer, departure of Steffen eleven weeks later, 
and subsequent ousting of CEO Kay Whitmore amid charges that he failed to respond 
quickly enough to investors' concerns). Interestingly, the reports of institutional 
activism, which seemingly led nowhere in terms of corporate performance, 
nonetheless generated an increase in Kodak's stock price from around $43/share in 
January 1993 to a 52-week high of $58/share in August. 
105 Change 's Pace Costs Kodak CEO, supra note 104, at 1 (quoting Brenda 
Landry, an investment analyst at Morgan Stanley); see also Hubert B. Herring, At 
Kodak, No Quick Fixes, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec . 19 ,  1993 , at F2 (describing plunge in 
Kodak stock price in December 1993 in response to statements by new chairman 
George Fisher explaining difficulty of solving Kodak's earnings problems) . 
106 See, e.g. , Alison L. Cowan, Advice Alone Can 't Cure Borden, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 12,  1993, at F13 .  
107 See id. (describing advice ranging from recruiting more food industry 
veterans onto the board of directors to hiring executives with turnaround expertise, 
and from recommending spin-offs of unprofitable divisions of the company to 
suggesting a sale of the entire company to a competitor such as Nestle). 
108 See, e.g. , Coffee, supra note 10, at 1328-36 (describing various ways in 
which investment objectives of institutional investors may rationally diverge from 
those of other shareholders or from the best interests of the corporation) . 
l09 For example, a state employees' pension fund may be pressured to invest in 
and be supportive of local business. This pressure may translate into limiting the 
investor's ability to support efficiency-driven corporate decisions if they would have 
j 
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decision may not affect all shareholders equally means that both the 
investor's evaluation of corporate performance and its determination of 
changes in corporate decisionmaking may be based on its private interests 
that are distinct from interests common to the entire shareholder class. 1 1o 
A lack of complete alignment between the interests of the institutional 
investor and other shareholders may generate a variety of effects, the 
complete analysis of which is beyond the scope of this Article. The 
potential divergence of interest is significant, however, for the problem 
posed here, because it provides an alternative explanation both for 
increasing shareholder activism and for the ability of some relationship 
investors to achieve superior returns : the monitoring investor may be using 
relationship investing to generate private gains for itself rather than 
improved profits for the target corporation. 
The monitoring model described above and the advocates of 
relationship investing share a common assumption: that a monitoring 
investor will use its influence to increase, in a general way, the value of 
the target company. Hence returns from monitoring will be shared by all 
shareholders in proportion to their ownership interest. 1 1 1  Such returns 
might be described as public gains from monitoring. Alternatively, 
however, the influence can be used to produce returns that accrue to the 
monitoring shareholder in some proportion greater than the shareholder's 
ownership interest. We might term any such excess returns as private 
gains . 1 12 
an adverse impact on in-state interests, such as jobs. From the investor's perspective, 
it is not making an irrational choice; it is simply recognizing an interest not common 
to other shareholders as part of the calculus. 
1 1° For an example of a rational divergence between the interests of an indexed 
institutional investor and those of other shareholders with respect to the desirability of 
takeovers, see Wingerson & Dorn, supra note 77. Wingerson and Dorn observe that 
an indexed investor is essentially invested in all companies and therefore benefits from 
reducing the cost of intercompany transactions such as takeovers, even if the 
transactions are not beneficial from the perspective of a particular company. "In 
addition, indexed investors tend to benefit from reduced competition within an 
industry, and takeovers are a legal means of reducing competition. Id. at 247-48 .  
1 1 1  It is possible to create a more complicated version of the model in which side 
payments are permitted to enable shareholders to overcome collective action 
problems. Such a model would retain the assumption that monitoring will result in a 
net gain to all shareholders but would relax the assumption of pro rata distribution of 
that gain. 
1 12 To the extent that an investor is able to generate returns that accrue 
exclusively to it, the entire gain is a private gain. If, however, the investor merely 
receives a greater proportion of the gain than other shareholders, only the excess 
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Private gains can result from any situation in which the monitoring 
investor can obtain a benefit not generally available to other investors . For 
example, an investor can use its influence over an issuer to achieve private 
gains in connection with control transactions such as corporate 
takeovers, 1 13 from personalized securities transactions such as the sale to 
an investor of "sweetheart preferred stock, " and by obtaining preferential 
treatment in business transactions between itself and the issuer . 1 14 
In the mathematical model, private gains operate in the exact reverse 
manner of monitoring costs : they accrue exclusively to the benefit of the 
monitoring shareholder. Thus, we can reflect private gains in the 
mathematical model simply by adding them as a positive return on the 
investment. If an investor's private gains from monitoring investment i are 
designated as P(i), the gains available from monitoring will be p.' (i) (A (i)IT 
- M(i)IZ) - C(m) - a(A(i)IT) + P(i), and the investor will monitor as long 
as those gains are greater than zero. 1 15 Moreover, private gains are 
frequently less speculative than gains through monitoring. 1 16 Thus a 
rational investor is likely to be at least as will ing to receive private gains as 
public gains as a result of relationship investing. 
Friendly relationships between large investors and management can, 
and often do, result in the creation of private gains . 1 17 For example, a 
return constitutes a private gain. 
1 13 It is generally assumed that control transactions provide both public and 
private gains. The control premium is a public gain, which is distributed to all 
shareholders. A private gain is also necessary, however, to justify the costs of the 
acquisition to the purchasing shareholder. Depending on one's view of the economics 
of the corporate takeover, the private gain may be properly attributable to economies 
of scale, intracorporate business transactions, or the ability to select more efficient 
replacement management-as suggested by those in favor of the hostile tender offer. 
Alternatively, the gain may result from the acquirer's ability to exploit or loot target 
company assets-the explanation of those who would regulate tender offers. 
1 14 See also Peter V. Letsou, Shareholder Voice and the Market for Corporate 
Control, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 755, 780 (1992) (describing the ability of a shareholder to 
use the corporate proxy machinery to obtain publicity regarding issues of particular 
concern to that shareholder as another example of private gains) . 
1 15 Because private gains are not shared with other shareholders, they do not 
affect the market rate of return, and, on a relative basis, they still provide an absolute 
benefit to the monitoring shareholder. Accordingly, for any given level of monitoring 
expenditures, private returns can be viewed as a constant, like monitoring costs. 
1 16 See Rock, Controlling the Dark Side, supra note 55 , at 1003 .  
1 17 An active investor can achieve private gains even i f  i t  has a n  unfriendly 
relationship with management, but the opportunities to generate such gains are more 
limited. 
1994] RELATIONSHIP INVESTING 1 04 1  
friendly investor may make its investment in  a target company through the 
purchase of a different type of security or different class of stock than that 
owned by public shareholders . 1 18 This relationship offers the opportunity 
for the investor to receive a return that differs from that available to 
common shareholders . 1 19 
The risk is that a friendly investor can receive private gains even if its 
monitoring does not add value to the target corporation and even if other 
shareholders do not benefit. In the extreme case, the investor may use its 
influence to appropriate corporate value for itself without improving 
corporate performance at all . 120 Professor Rock, who has done the most 
1 1 8  Frequently the investor will purchase what is known as "sweetheart" 
preferred stock. The investor may receive private gains because the stock is sold at a 
lower price than it would fetch on the open market, or because the stock has special 
attributes such as conversion rights, lower risk or higher dividend payments. This type 
of securities transaction may result from management's desire to secure an infusion of 
"friendly capital" for the purposes of protecting the autonomy of existing 
management. In such a case, the investor is receiving sweetheart preferred stock as a 
form of protection money. 
On the other hand, some commentators defend the practice of placing a large 
block of corporate securities in friendly hands by arguing that, among other things, 
this type of transaction insulates management from so-called distorted discipline, 
which might include overly aggressive threats of takeovers that prevent management 
from acting in the long-term interests of shareholders. See, e.g. , Ian Ayres & Peter 
Cramton, An Agency Perspective on Relational Investing (prelim. draft 1993) (on file 
with author) . If this explanation is correct, the placement will ultimately increase 
returns to all shareholders by allowing management to run the corporation more 
effectively. A study conducted by Wruck examines the effect of announcements of 
private block sales by corporations of new equity, both common and preferred, on 
common stock price. Wruck concludes that the announcements have a net positive 
effect on common stock prices of approximately 4.5 % and attributes the price 
increases to the market's belief that the presence of a concentrated monitor will 
increase long-term performance and value. Wruck, Equity Ownership Concentration 
and Finn Value: Evidence from Private Equity Finandngs, 23 J.  FIN. EcoN. 3 (1989) .  
1 19 In Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971),  the court 
suggested that it would be a breach of fiduciary duty for a controlling shareholder to 
use its influence to pay dividends only to itself, even by use of a distinct class of stock. 
Most institutional stakes are too small, however, to subject investors to the fiduciary 
duties imposed on controlling shareholders. 
120 A pure economic analysis might evaluate the institution's influence in terms of 
net social gains by weighing the gain by the institution against the loss suffered by 
other investors. Most people would reject such an approach and require that 
institutional monitoring produce results that were at least pareto superior. In other 
words, a minimum criterion for effective institutional monitoring is that it increase 
returns to some investors without decreasing the return to anyone. A more demanding 
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extensive work on the subject of  private gains to date, describes this 
scenario as " 'corrupt' relational investing. " 121 
For example, Professor Rock describes the purchase by Corporate 
Partners122 of a special class of Polaroid preferred stock in exchange for 
protecting Polaroid against a tender offer by Diamond Shamrock. 123 Over a 
two-and-a-half year period, Corporate Partners earned an annual return of 
nearly twenty percent on its investment. 124 Polaroid common stock 
declined in value during the same time period. 125 The case illustrates the 
possibility that Corporate Partners' success in generating superior returns 
for its fund may reflect its willingness to assist management rather than its 
abil ity to improve corporate performance. 
Institutions may also use their influence to improve their business 
relationships with the target company . 126 For example, although the 
relationship between the House of Morgan and the corporations in which it 
invested is often cited as an example of the effectiveness of relationship 
investing, 127 the Morgan Bank enjoyed a variety of business relationships 
standard would require that monitoring provide at least some public gains and not 
benefit the institutional investor exclusively. 
12 1  Rock, Controlling the Dark Side, supra note 55, at 989. 
122 Corporate Partners bills itself as " 'organized to make friendly investments, 
usually by taking large minority equity positions of approximately 10% to 30% in 
publicly held companies which could benefit from the presence of a large supportive 
shareholder. . . . " '  It has also described itself as " 'able to provide insulation from 
market operators and hostile acquirers . . . .  ' "  Shamrock Holdings v. Polaroid Corp . ,  
709 F .  Supp. 13 1 1 ,  1326 (D. Del. 1989) (quoting Corporate Partners' descriptive 
brochure) . 
123 Rock, Controlling the Dark Side, supra note 55, at 990-93. 
124 /d. at 993 . The return resulted from a combination of profits from the resale 
of the stock to Polaroid and $30 million in dividends payable on the preferred stock. 
125 /d. 
126 Improved business relationships are a possible explanation for the synergistic 
monitoring achieved by the Japanese keiretsu. Members of the keiretsu have a web of 
business relationships, including those of debtor-creditor and customer-supplier. See, 
e.g. , Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps 
Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 87 1 ,  882-
83 (1993) ; Roe, Differences, supra note 57, at 1985-86. The keiretsu allows the large 
block holders to improve their business operations through active monitoring and also 
serves to reduce risk and opportunistic behavior associated with the investor's business 
dealings with the target company. Such improvements all constitute private gains. 
127 E.g. , David P. Hale, Learning from Germany and Japan, WALL ST. J. , Feb. 
4, 199 1 ,  at A10 (arguing that American banks such as Morgan were effective 
corporate monitors until the early 1900s); cj. Garten, supra note 57, at 590 n. 1 5  
(describing as "surprising" the number o f  scholars who cite the House o f  Morgan as 
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with issuers through which it received gains not available to other 
equityholders and gains that may not have reflected value added by 
Morgan. 128 
Professor Rock argues that Lazard Freres, the manager of the 
Corporate Partners fund, has been able to take similar advantage of 
Corporate Partners' investments to achieve increased investment banking 
business (and fees) . 129 For example, Rock describes the fact that Lazard 
Freres earned over fourteen mill ion dollars in investment banking fees 
from its involvement with Transco Energy Company during the time 
period 1989 through 1992. During that same time period, Corporate 
Partners owned $ 125 mill ion of a special issue of convertible preferred 
stock, representing nine percent of the voting power of Transco . l30 
E .  I .  du Pont de Nemours & Company (Du Pont)'s relationship with 
General Motors in the early 1900s provides Rock with another illustration 
of an investor's ability to use its power to generate improved business . 13 1 
In 1 9 17, Du Pont purchased approximately twenty-three percent of the 
stock of General Motors . 132 During the subsequent forty years, Du Pont 
exercised a substantial amount of influence over General Motors' policies, 
exemplifying the type of long-term investor/issuer relationship currently in 
vogue. 133 In the course of this relationship, General Motors purchased an 
increasing percentage of its paints, finishes, and coated fabrics from Du 
Pont. 
Eventually, the United States brought a successful antitrust suit against 
Du Pont, claiming that Du Pont's acquisition of General Motors stock had 
resulted in Du Pont obtaining an illegal preference over its competitors in 
product sales to General Motors . Although it is not clear that Du Pont had 
the model of an effective institutional investor) . 
128 See Garten, supra note 57, at 590 (describing power of institutional investors 
like the old House of Morgan as arising "from multiple financial and professional 
relationships with a firm . . . .  The institution's role as lender, underwriter, and 
financial advisor made it a true partner of management. ") .  
129 Rock, Controlling the Dark Side, supra note 55 , at 998-99. 
130 Corporate Partners purchased the stock in early 1989. 
13 1 Indeed, Professor Louis Lowenstein cites the relationship between Du Pont 
and GM in the 1920s as a model for contemporary relationship investing. LoUis 
LoWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN CORPORATE FINANCE 21 1-17 (1991). 
132 The history and nature of the acquisition are described in United States v. E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co. ,  353 U.S. 586 ,  600-02 (1957). 
133 See, e.g. , Louis Lowenstein, More Like Whom ?, Opening Remarks, 
Conference on Relational Investing, at 12 (Appendix) (New York, May 6 ,  1993) (on 
file with author) (describing the Du Pont/General Motors relationship as an illustration 
of relational investing) . 
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received preferential treatment as a result of its actual or perceived 
influence over General Motors' purchasing decisions, 134 the Supreme 
Court's majority opinion observed that " [t]he inference is overwhelming 
that Du Pont's commanding position [as supplier to General Motors] was 
promoted by its stock interest and was not gained solely on competitive 
merit. " 135 
The abil ity to create private gains at the expense of other shareholders 
is not limited to private institutional investors . Efforts by public pension 
funds to influence corporate policies to address political rather than 
economic concerns can also be viewed as a type of private gain. A pension 
fund may, for example, be able to extract concessions from portfolio 
companies to benefit local constituencies, such as in-state employment 
commitments . 136 Although it is not clear that activism focused on creation 
of jobs or preservation of in-state business will result in poorer economic 
performance by target companies , 137 this type of strategy has the potential 
to place the goals of the fund in conflict with those of other shareholders . 
The creation of private gains means that the decision to monitor may 
be completely unrelated to the creation of value for common shareholders . 
In other words, rational monitoring decisions, according to the model , will 
sometimes result in shareholder activism that does not generally improve 
corporate performance. If private gains are not available, shareholders will 
sometimes continue to forgo activism that would benefit the target 
company. The availability of private gains creates an incentive for an 
institutional investor to use its influence to appropriate existing corporate 
value rather than to improve corporate performance. 138 
134 The dissenting opinion takes issue with the majority on precisely this point. 
See Du Pont, 353 U.S. at 627-46 (Burton, J . ,  dissenting) (analyzing purchasing 
decisions by General Motors and concluding that decisions were made on the basis of 
competitive merit and did not result from Du Pont's participation or influence in 
General Motors' affairs) . 
135 Id. at 605 (emphasis added). 
136 For example, a recent article described the views of Olena Berg, the new 
Assistant Secretary of Labor for Pension and Welfare Benefits, as encouraging pension 
funds to focus on investments targeted to increase jobs. Wayne, supra note 65, at D l .  
See also Vanecko, supra note 3 ,  at 413 (noting that pension funds may respond to 
citizens' political concerns in making investment decisions regardless of whether the 
political investing is in the best interests of fund beneficiaries). 
1 37 See Wayne, supra note 65, at D14 (describing mixed track record of 
"economically targeted investments" by pension funds) . 
138 See Letsou, supra note 1 14, at 780-90 (describing various ways an 
institutional investor can use its influence to extract private gains rather than to benefit 
the corporation) . 
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Professor Rock describes the abil ity of an institution to maxtmlZe its 
self-interest at the expense of corporate value as the "dark side" of 
relationship investing. 139 Courts and commentators have traditionally 
viewed the generation of private gains as a corruption of the investor's 
relationship with its portfolio company . 140 This conclusion is ,  however, 
too facile. The use of investor influence to create private gains should not 
be viewed as per se proof that the influence is being used inappropriately .  
The better inquiry is whether the relationship results in  a net gain to other 
stockholders.  
In other words , a relationship that generates greater profits for all 
shareholders and an additional quantity of exclusively private gains 
provides both a net benefit to the corporation and a pareto superior 
outcome. 141 This type of activism should be encouraged even if the 
monitoring investor receives more than a pro rata share of that benefit. 142 
The private gains may be viewed as compensation for the particular costs 
and risks borne by the monitoring investor. Within the context of the 
overall relationship, private gains offer a potential solution to the 
disincentive created by free riding. 
The problem is that the empirical evidence, to date, offers no way to 
distinguish between good instances of relationship investing and "corrupt" 
relationships}43 In other words, the evidence does not establish whether 
monitoring creates value. Moreover, l iberalization of judicial views toward 
139 Rock, Controlling the Dark Side, supra note 55. 
140 See, e.g. , Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 
U.S. 952 (1955) (requiring controlling shareholder to share his sale premium on a pro 
rata basis with the minority shareholders); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co. ,  460 P.2d 
464 (Cal. 1969) (finding breach of fiduciary duty where group of controlling 
shareholders used their influence to obtain benefits not available to minority 
shareholders) ; cf. Sinclair Oil Corp . v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (appropriate 
test for determining whether controlling shareholder has abused its position is whether 
controlling shareholder receives value from the company to the exclusion of the 
minority shareholders) . 
141 The requirement of pareto superiority is that no investor's position is made 
worse as a result of the institutional participation. 
142 For an application of similar analysis to the sale of control by large block 
investors, see Einer Elhauge, The Triggering Function of Sale of Control Doctrine, 59 
U. CHI. L. REv. 1465 (1992) . 
143 See, e.g. , Rock, Controlling the Dark Side, supra note 55, at 995 (recent 
empirical work suggests that the relatively superior returns identified in relationship 
investing are likely the result of the creation of private gains) . 
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private gains poses a danger of its own: the danger that a monitoring 
shareholder will retain all of the gains created by monitoring or go even 
further and actually reduce returns to common shareholders . 144 
In many ways , the problem of assessing the value of institutional 
activism is similar to the question posed in the early 1980s about whether 
insider trading should be deregulated . Advocates of deregulation argued 
that the private gains available to corporate officials through insider trading 
were more than offset by gains to the corporation, including the ability to 
attract competent management for lesser salaries and improved corporate 
performance. 145 Thus,  according to these commentators, deregulation 
would allow corporate insiders to generate private gains, the allocation of 
which could be determined by contract between the insiders and the 
corporation. 146 The private gains would give insiders the incentive to 
create corporate value, and the incentive structure would cost the 
corporation less than achieving the same objectives through direct 
compensation . 147 
Critics of deregulation raised a variety of concerns about the 
deleterious effect of insider trading . In particular, they responded to the 
foregoing argument by suggesting that there was no reason to suppose 
insiders would perform more diligently,  thereby increasing corporate 
value, if they were given the right to trade on inside information. 148 It was 
144 Indeed, the Gordon Group Study recommends that CalPERS exercise caution 
that high returns to the activist fund not come at the expense of its common 
stockholdings. Gordon Group Study, supra note 58, at 46. Presumably this concern 
identifies the possibility that private gains may be generated not simply as an 
alternative to public gains, but as an adjunct to public losses. 
145 See, e.g. , Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel , The Regulation of Insider 
Trading, 35 STAN . L. REv. 857 (1983); Daniel R. Fischel, Insider Trading and 
Investment Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 127 (1984); Kenneth E. Scott, Insider Trading: 
Rule JOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL STUD . 801 (1980). 
146 See also Jill E.  Fisch, Start Making Sense: An Analysis and Proposal for 
Insider Trading Regulation, 26 GA. L. REv. 179 ,  224-26 (199 1) (describing argument 
that the use of inside information should be allocated, as other property rights, by 
private contract) . 
147 See also Carlton & Fischel, supra note 145,  at 870-71 (using insider trading 
to compensate executives may lead to desirable management behavior) ; Ronald A.  
Dye, Insider Trading and Incentives, 57 J. Bus. 295 (1984) (describing econometric 
analysis of insider trading as compensation). 
148 See, e.g. , Iman Anabtawi, Note, Toward a Definition of Insider Trading, 4 1  
STAN. L .  REv. 377, 386 (1989) (arguing that inability o f  shareholders to monitor may 
result in managers failing to maximize shareholder wealth) ; see also Fisch, supra note 
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also not clear that insiders would agree to accept reduced salaries in 
exchange for the ability to trade on inside information. Thus, if the private 
gains of insider trading were viewed within the context of the relationship 
between the corporate official and the corporation, existing empirical 
evidence could not determine whether allowing private gains would benefit 
the corporation. 149 
Although this Article suggests caution, for the same reasons, in 
viewing increased institutional activism as the remedy for poor 
performance by United States corporations, the questions posed by 
relationship investing can be answered . The next step in studying the value 
of institutional investing requires recognition of the fact that institutional 
presence, by itself, is not evidence of monitoring. Moreover, even if stock 
price, in the short run, responds to the announcement of a block position, 
the block investor need not be improving corporate performance. There is 
a considerable difference between institutional presence and institutional 
voice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Institutions are the new darlings of the corporate governance 
movement. Many commentators are convinced that institutions present a 
vehicle for improving United States corporate decisionmaking and 
efficiency. Yet the value of the institutional investor depends on its 
decision to participate actively in corporate monitoring. This Article has 
suggested that, in the absence of an opportunity for institutions to achieve 
some private gains, the risks of active investing for most institutional 
investors outweigh the benefits . Accordingly, it may be appropriate to take 
a more l iberal view of private gains, by considering them within the 
context of the monitoring relationship . Before the legal constraints on an 
146 ,  at 219 n . 1 8 1  (describing additional problems with using insider trading as 
management compensation, including the risk of moral hazard) . 
149 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading as an Agency Problem, in 
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 8 1 ,  90-97 (J. Pratt & R. 
Zeckhauser eds. , 1985); Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, 
Evidentiary Privileges and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REv. 309, 
332 (1981) ;  Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Trading on Inside 
Information, 36 THE LAW SCHOOL RECORD 10, 14 (1990) (private contract theory may 
not achieve optimal allocation of the property rights in information due to a variety of 
factors, including the difficulty in enforcing contracts that restrict insider trading 
because of the practical problems of detecting improper trades; accordingly, 
deregulation of insider trading may not be beneficial for corporations) . 
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investor's ability to generate private gains are relaxed to facil itate 
relationship investing, however, it should be established that institutional 
monitoring will actually add value to United States corporations . For 
relationship investing to be socially beneficial , it must generate gains to 
public shareholders, as well as private gains . Its ability to create such 
public value remains, as yet, uncertain .  
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